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1. Introduction 
 Over the past twenty years, there have arisen two competing theories of the 
multinational enterprise (MNE). In the horizontal model (Markusen, 1984), foreign direct 
investment (FDI) arises because of firm-level scale economies combined with barriers to 
trade. In the vertical model (Helpman, 1984), FDI occurs when production is fragmented 
across borders because of international factor price differences. Recently, a body of 
empirical work has emerged that finds that most FDI takes place between similar 
countries (see, for example, Markusen and Maskus (1999) or Blonigen, Davies, and Head 
(2003)). Since similar countries are likely to have similar factor prices, these findings 
have been interpreted as support for the horizontal model. An alternative reading of the 
data, however, simply says that most FDI flows from and goes to skill-rich countries. In 
this paper, I offer a new model of FDI in which investment is driven by 
complementarities between the types of skilled labor available in different countries. This 
leads the MNE to fragment the headquarter part of its production across borders. This 
fragmentation implies that FDI is most prevalent between countries with large pools of 
skilled labor, a result that matches the data. In addition, my model yields two major 
changes relative to the standard models of FDI. First, MNEs arise even with identical 
countries, no scale economies, and no trade costs. Second, depending on the size of the 
complementarities, an increase in FDI can lead to an increase in the wages of both skilled 
and unskilled domestic labor, a result which may alleviate some of the concerns over 
outbound FDI. 
 In the next section, I discuss the role of fragmentation in the existing FDI 
literature. I also include a summary of the relevant empirical evidence. There, I note 
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some of the issues that the most common interpretation of the data cannot explain. In 
Section 3, I present my model and discuss its implications for investment patterns and 
wages. Section 4 concludes with some potential implications of fragmented headquarter 
services for government policy.  
 
2. Fragmentation and FDI 
 Fragmentation plays an important role in both the horizontal and vertical models 
of FDI. In both, production of the MNE’s good is a two stage process. In the first stage, 
the MNE produces headquarter services. These are intended to represent research and 
development, management, advertising, and the like. As summarized by Caves (1993), in 
the earliest work on FDI these services took on a prominent role because they gave the 
firm a reason to internalize its overseas activities, thereby creating the distinction 
between FDI and simple outsourcing. These headquarter services are then combined with 
other factors in a production stage. Although early models such as Helpman (1984) and 
Markusen (1984) used the traditional capital/labor dichotomy, more recently the focus 
has shifted to the interplay between skilled and unskilled labor (see for example 
Venables, 1999, or Markusen and Venables, 2000). In this work, headquarter services are 
generally assumed to be skill-intensive relative to production of the MNE’s good. MNE 
production is in turn skill-intensive relative to the production of other goods in the 
economy. Regardless of factors used in each stage, it is generally thought that these 
stages can be fragmented and carried out in different countries with the MNE’s home or 
parent country defined as the location in which it does its headquarter activities. The way 
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in which headquarter services are used in the production stage is critical when 
differentiating between the vertical and horizontal models. 
 In the horizontal model, headquarter services are a joint input that can be used in 
multiple production facilities without reducing their marginal productivity. Thus, a single 
firm with production in two countries has a cost advantage over two separate, national 
firms because it need not duplicate production of the headquarter services. This yields 
firm-level scale economies. When the joint input nature of headquarter services is 
combined with trade barriers (either natural or artificial), the firm has an incentive to 
produce in both countries in order to serve each market locally. This implies that there is 
FDI. Note that although there is a vertical relationship with the headquarter services 
acting as an intermediate input, that the production of the same final good in multiple 
countries leads to the “horizontal” designation. On implication of this motivation for 
MNEs is that horizontal FDI is a substitute for trade because FDI replaces exports. Note 
the importance of trade barriers to this result, because under constant returns to scale, 
horizontal FDI is unnecessary unless there is a cost savings to producing in each market. 
Furthermore, if there are plant-level fixed costs, as assumed by Markusen and Venables 
(1998) and others, then trade barriers become a necessary condition for horizontal FDI. 
 In the vertical model, FDI results from the forces that are typically associated with 
fragmentation, namely, factor price differences. In Helpman’s (1984) original model, FDI 
occurs when relative factor endowments lie outside the factor price equalization set, i.e. 
trade alone cannot equilibrate factor prices. Thus, FDI flows from the skill-abundant 
home country to the skill-deficient host.1 Recent models in this vein include Feenstra and 
                                                 
1 Note that in order for firms to choose overseas investment instead of outsourcing, there must also be an 
internalization motivation as described by Caves (1993).  
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Hanson (1996a, 1997) and Eckel (2003).2 Vertical FDI has similar motivations as the 
fragmentation of trade through outsourcing since countries specialize in stages of the 
production process according to their comparative advantage. It is important to note, 
however, that this outsourcing does not count legally as FDI and therefore is not counted 
as such in the data. Thus, in the vertical MNE, the firm creates headquarter services in 
one country and produces in the other. One result of this is that FDI is a compliment to 
trade because increased FDI means more overseas production, some of which is shipped 
back home. 
 Recently, there has been a push to integrate the horizontal and vertical 
motivations into a single, unified framework. Examples of this work include Markusen, 
Venables, Konan, and Zhang (1996), Venables (1999), and Markusen (2002). One of the 
key findings from this exercise is that the prevalence of the two types of FDI depends on 
the parameters of the model. In particular, horizontal FDI is more common when relative 
endowments are equal whereas vertical FDI arises when endowments differ. Since the 
horizontal firm must produce in both countries, as endowments differ and factor prices 
diverge, the MNE has an incentive to switch either to a vertical or national firm structure 
in which it eliminates fragmentation. Vertical FDI, however, exists precisely because 
very different endowments create factor price differences that cannot be eliminated by the 
trade in goods. This difference in these two models has been exploited by empirical 
researchers including Markusen and Maskus (1999) and Blonigen, Davies, and Head 
(2003), who find that most FDI takes place between countries with similar endowments. 
They interpret this finding as evidence that most FDI fits the horizontal model. In fact, 
                                                 
2 While I do not discuss the literature on fragmentation of trade, I refer the interested reader to Dixit and 
Grossman (1982) or Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) as solid gateways into the topic. 
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evidence of vertical FDI is relatively hard to come by, although Davies (2002) and 
Braconier, Norbäck, and Urban (2002) do find some evidence suggestive of vertical FDI. 
 While these results might seem to put the issue to rest, there remain some 
difficulties in reconciling the evidence with the theory. First, although horizontal FDI is 
intended to replace trade in goods, there remains a significant amount of trade not only 
between developed countries but within the MNEs they share. According to the numbers 
presented by Markusen (2002) and reproduced in Table 1, intra-firm trade for U.S. 
affiliates in developed countries accounts for approximately ten percent of affiliate sales. 
For foreign affiliates in the U.S. from developed countries, such trade accounts for 
approximately one quarter of affiliate sales. This amount of intra-firm trade suggests that 
even between countries with similar costs, there is a good deal of fragmentation 
occurring.  
 Second, one of the results common to both horizontal and vertical FDI models is 
that FDI can have detrimental effects on the wages paid to domestic factors, especially 
those used in the production stage. In the vertical model, this effect is obvious since the 
point of FDI is to relocate production to where the factors used intensively in production 
(such as unskilled labor) are cheapest. In Helpman’s (1984) original version, this can go 
so far as to equalize factor prices, with all of the distributional effects that factor price 
equalization entails.3 In horizontal models, because FDI replaces domestic production a 
comparable effect can arise. Thus, the expectation is that increases in outbound FDI 
should reduce the wages of unskilled workers at home. Nevertheless, this effect is 
notoriously difficult to find. Surveys by the OECD (1995) and Slaughter and Swagel 
                                                 
3 As noted by Helpman (1984) and Venables (1999) for very unequal relative endowments, factor prices 
may not equalize even with trade and FDI,. 
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(1997) report that on the whole, outbound FDI appears to have little impact on wage 
differentials. More recent evidence from Slaughter (2000) finds similar results.4 There do 
exist potential explanations for this non-effect in the literature. Braconier and Ekholm 
(2000) and Eckel (2003) show that due to cost savings created by relocating production to 
low cost locations, there is an efficiency-enhancing effect that increases domestic wages. 
When this is paired with the production shift, the net effect on wages is ambiguous. 
However, both consider vertical FDI which the data suggests is fairly rare. In the 
horizontal model, it is also possible to find an increase in domestic wages with FDI. To 
obtain this result, consider a world in which there is no FDI but with two national firms. 
When these are replaced by a single MNE, this creates a cost savings by eliminating 
duplication of headquarter services. Comparable to Braconier and Ekholm (2000) or 
Eckel (2003), if this savings is large enough, then the creation of a MNE can increase 
production at home and increase the wages of production workers. However, this result 
comes about from a change in market structure, thus an expansion of an existing MNE 
would still be expected to decrease domestic production wages. Thus, the existing models 
do not provide fully convincing explanations for the missing wage effect. 
 Third, if FDI is intended to serve a local market as the horizontal model suggests, 
then one would expect host country trade barriers to be positively related to FDI. While 
the empirical evidence on FDI generally finds such a relationship, there remain surprises. 
For example, one would expect the creation of trade agreements such as NAFTA to 
divert FDI by non-member countries from the high-cost U.S. to low-cost Mexico. 
Nevertheless, although Mexico did see an increase in inbound FDI after NAFTA, as 
                                                 
4 Feenstra and Hanson (1996c), and Sachs and Shatz (1994) do, however, find a negative effect of 
outsourcing on the relative wage of unskilled workers, again highlighting the differences between FDI and 
outsourcing. 
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Waldkirch (2003) shows, this was the result of increased investment from the U.S. and 
Canada, not from non-NAFTA countries. Thus, despite the ability to shift production to 
the low-cost Mexico yet still serve the lucrative U.S. market cheaply, European firms did 
not react as expected. 
 Because of these unanswered questions, there is a need for additional models of 
FDI that rely neither on factor price differences no trade barriers. Additionally, these 
models should include forces by which increased FDI can have positive effects on 
domestic unskilled wages. To that end, I offer a model in which, rather than separating 
headquarter activities from production as in the traditional fragmentation models, I allow 
MNEs to fragment the creation of their headquarter services across borders. One reason 
that a firm would do so is that skilled workers from different backgrounds provide 
different viewpoints and ideas that compliment one another. Thus, even though workers 
may be employed in similar occupations or have the same amount of education – 
common proxies for skill – they may complement one another in a way that workers from 
the same country do not. Since labor is not especially mobile across borders, the 
immobility of these different skilled workers gives firms a reason to locate an office in a 
different country.5 Since this does not rely on factor price differences, FDI occurs 
between identical countries even without trade costs. Furthermore, this suggests that FDI 
is most likely to come from and go to countries with large amounts of skilled workers.  
 As Markusen (2002) reports, the skill-abundant developed countries are the 
homes of approximately 95 percent of FDI and are hosts for approximately 75 percent of 
                                                 
5 As detailed in Graham and Krugman (1995), an office or other place of management that lasts more than 
twelve months satisfies the definition of a permanent establishment, a condition necessary for economic 
activity to be classified as FDI. Thus, the legal definition and the data include more activity than simply 
actual production. 
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FDI. Thus, the data reflects that most FDI does indeed come from and go to skill-
abundant countries. However, when studies such as Markusen and Maskus (1999) find a 
negative effect of skill differences on FDI, it may be that they are simply capturing the 
impact of small supplies of skilled labor in one country or the other. As a test of this 
possibility, I offer the regression results in Table 2. These results come from OLS 
estimation of the FDI empirical specification established by Carr, Markusen, and Maskus 
(2001). I use their graciously-provided data, which is the same data used by Markusen 
and Maskus (1999) and Blonigen, Davies, and Head (2003). In the interest of space, I 
refer the interested reader to Carr, Markusen, and Maskus for a detailed description of the 
variables and the data. For my current devices, it suffices to note that the dependent 
variable is sales by affiliates of U.S. MNEs and foreign-owned affiliates in the U.S. for 
the period 1986 to 1994. Also, it is worth noting that the measure of skilled labor 
availability is the percentage of workers employed in either the 0/1 (professional, 
technical, and kindred workers) or 2 (administrative workers) job categories in the parent 
minus that in the host.6 There are two differences in my specification relative to that of 
Carr, Markusen, and Maskus. First, as per the issues raised by Blonigen, Davies, and 
Head, I separately estimate results for skill-abundant (Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2) and 
skill-deficient parents (Columns 3 and 4).7 Second, in Columns 1 and 3 I use the skill 
difference between the home and host countries as in the original empirical specification. 
In Columns 2 and 4, I instead use the endowment of skilled labor in the home and host 
countries separately. 
                                                 
6 This data comes from the International Labor Organization. 
7 Note that using this measure of skill, the U.S. is almost always the skill-abundant country. 
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 Focusing attention on the skill variable, in columns 1 and 3, I find that FDI 
activity is decreasing in skill differences. This is the result found by Markusen and 
Maskus (1999) and Blonigen, Davies, and Head (2003) who interpreted it as evidence of 
horizontal FDI.8 In columns 2 and 4, however, I find that FDI is increasing in the amount 
of skill available of both countries. Furthermore, the fit of the specification improves 
considerably, raising the R2 for positive skill differences from .55 to .71 and for negative 
skill differences from .47 to .57. Thus, this suggests that the difference variable is 
capturing low levels of skill in either the home or host and that it is not necessarily 
differences that matter so much as the amount of skill available in each country.  
 A second implication of this fragmented headquarters model of FDI is that 
because overseas skilled labor can be a complement for both skilled and unskilled 
domestic FDI, increases in FDI result in wage increases for both types of domestic labor. 
Therefore increases in FDI need not lower domestic wages and can in fact increase the 
relative wage of unskilled workers. 
 With these goals for my model of FDI in mind, I now lay it out in detail.  
 
3. A Simple Model of Fragmented Headquarter Services 
 In this section I present a basic model with headquarter fragmentation. This model 
does not include many issues commonly found in models of FDI or fragmentation such as 
imperfect competition or increasing returns to scale. While these matters are clearly 
important for developing an exhaustive model of FDI, I leave them out of the current 
presentation because even in this simple framework I find ambiguity in the interplay 
                                                 
8 In the negative column, recall that the positive coefficient means that as the skill difference gets less 
negative, i.e. goes towards zero, that FDI goes up. 
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between domestic and foreign inputs. Because this ambiguity would persist in a more 
complex model making any conclusions there conditional at best, I have chosen to focus 
the current discussion to gain a better perspective on the forces that give rise to this 
conflict in isolation.  
 Consider a world with three goods that are produced under perfect competition 
and sold at constant prices on the world market, indicating that both the home and host 
countries are small.9 There are no trade barriers. Good Y is produced using skilled labor 
and sector specific capital according to a constant returns to scale technology ( , )YY s K  
where the function is scaled such that the price of Y is one. A similar sector exists in the 
host market, where its output of Y is given by * * *( , )YY s K . Similarly, good Z is produced 
using unskilled labor and sector-specific capital according to the constant returns to scale 
technology ( , )zZ u K . Again, this function is scaled such that the price of Z is one.
10  
 Finally, a good X is produced using skilled and unskilled labor and sold at a 
constant price on the world market. This production takes place through a two-stage 
process. First, skilled labor is used to produce headquarter services. This labor can come 
either from the home country (S) or from the host country (S*). I impose two assumptions 
on this process. First, it is not necessary to use skilled labor from both countries, that is, 
all headquarter services can be produced in one country. Thus, although firms can 
become multinationals, this is not necessary for X to be produced. Second, there exist 
complementarities between domestic and foreign skilled labor. These complementarities 
are intended to represent the interaction of the differing ideas, skills, and backgrounds of 
                                                 
9 Again, these assumptions allow me to narrow the possible reasons for the emergence of MNEs. 
10 As noted below, I assume that all of the MNE’s unskilled labor is hired in the home country, allowing me 
to ignore the effect of the host’s Z sector. 
 11
skilled workers from the two countries. Combining these assumptions means that the 
production of headquarter services is:  
 * *( , )H S H S S S= + +  (1) 
As noted above, in order to remove increasing returns to scale arguments for FDI, I 
assume that the function *( , )H S S is homogeneous of degree one. These headquarter 
services are then combined with unskilled labor to produce the final good. This is 
represented by the constant returns to scale production function: 
 ( , )X X H U=  (2) 
which is scaled so that the price of X is equal to one. Since the X production function 
exhibits constant returns, in the absence of factor price differences and trade costs, there 
is no reason for the firm to maintain separate production facilities. Thus, in order to 
remove both horizontal and vertical motivations for fragmenting the production process, I 
assume that all unskilled labor is hired from a single source and that the firm sells its 
product on the world market from this single location. Note that this allows me to use S* 
as my measure of FDI.  
 The firm takes the prices of its three inputs as given. The price for domestic 
skilled labor is w, the price for foreign skilled labor is w*, and the price of unskilled labor 
is r. This yields a profit function for the MNE of: 
 * * * * *( , , ) ( ( , ) , )S S U X S H S S S U wS w S rUΠ = + + − − −  (3) 
Finally home endowments of skilled and unskilled labor are S and U  and the foreign 
endowment of skilled labor is *S . Using perfect competition in factor markets, the first 
order conditions of (3) yield three equilibrium conditions:  
 * *1 1 1( ( , ) , ) (1 ( , )) ( , )yX S H S S S U H S U Y S S K+ + ⋅ + = −  (4) 
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 * * * * * *1 2 1( ( , ) , ) (1 ( , )) ( , )yX S H S S S U H S U Y S S K+ + ⋅ + = −  (5) 
and 
 * *2 1( ( , ) , ) ( , )ZX S H S S S U Z U U K+ + = −  (6) 
where number subscripts denote derivatives with respect to the appropriate argument. 
These three conditions simply imply that the marginal benefit of each factor is equated 
across sectors. Note that I am assuming that both domestic and foreign skilled labor are 
employed in equilibrium, a condition which is guaranteed if the function H satisfies the 
Inada conditions. 
 From these three equilibrium conditions, I can derive the following results.  
 
 
Proposition 1: The MNE’s use of home skilled labor, host skilled labor, and unskilled 
labor in the multinational sector are all increasing in their own supplies. 
 
 
Proof: For notational convenience, I suppress the arguments of functions for the rest of 
the paper. It is also useful to define: 
 ( )2 * 2 *11 11 1 1 22 11 2 1 11 11 1 11 11 22 11
* *
1 22 11 22 11 22 11 11 11 11 11 1 11 1 2 12 11
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
( ) 2 (1 )(1 )
X Z H X H Y H X H Y X H Y X Z
X H Y X Z X Y Y Y Y Z X X H H H Z
Φ ≡ + + + + + + +
+ + + + − + +
 (7) 
which is negative. Differentiation of (4) through (6) yields the following comparative 
statics: 
 ( )2 *11 11 2 11 1 22 11 22 11(1 ) ( )( ) 0dS Y X H Z X H Y X ZdS = + + + + >Φ  (8) 
 ( )* * 211 11 1 11 1 11 11 22 11* (1 ) ( )( ) 0dS Y X H Z X H Y X ZdS = + + + + >Φ  (9) 
and 
 ( )(
( ) ( ) )
2 211
1 11 22 1 11 2 1 2 12
2 * 2 *
11 11 2 1 22 11 11 1 1 11 11 11
(1 ) (1 ) 2(1 )(1 )
(1 ) (1 ) 0
dU Z X X H H H H H H H
dU
Y X H X H Y X H X H Y Y
= + + + − + +Φ
+ + + + + + + >
 (10) 
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           Q.E.D. 
The intuition for this result is straightforward; with an increase in the supply of these 
non-specific factors, given the fixed amount of sector-specific capital in the Y and Z 
sectors, their factor prices fall, leading to greater use of them in the production of X. 
Although I leave out the exact derivation, a rise in Ky reduces S, a rise in Ky* reduces S*, 
and a rise in KZ reduces U for comparable reasons. The interaction between skilled labor, 
regardless of its nationality, and unskilled labor is also straightforward. 
 
Proposition 2: An increase in the supply of skilled labor in either country increases the 
amount of unskilled labor used in the production of the multinational good. Also, an 
increase in the supply of unskilled labor increases the use of skilled labor from both 
countries in the multinational sector.  
 
 
Proof: Again, differentiating the equilibrium conditions, I find that: 
 ( )*11 12 1 12 2 1 1 22 11(1 ) (1 )( 0dU Y X X H H H X H YdS = + − + + >Φ  (11) 
 ( )*11 12 1 12 1 2 1 11 11* (1 ) (1 )( 0dU Y X X H H H X H YdS = + − + + >Φ  (12) 
 ( )*11 12 1 12 2 1 1 22 11(1 ) (1 )( 0dS Z X X H H H X H YdU = + − + + >Φ  (13) 
 ( )* 11 12 1 12 1 2 1 11 11(1 ) (1 )( 0dS Z X X H H H X H YdU = + − + + >Φ  (14) 
           Q.E.D. 
As the supply of skilled labor in either country rises, more is employed in X production, 
raising the productivity and the use of unskilled labor in that sector. Similarly, as the 
supply of unskilled labor rises, increasing the use of unskilled labor in X production, this 
increases the productivity and use of skilled labor from both countries in that sector. The 
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interaction between the supply of skilled labor in one country and the use of skilled labor 
from the other is less clear, however. Again using my equilibrium conditions, I find that: 
 ( )* 11 1 12 22 11 11 1 2 11( ) (1 )(1 )dS Y X H X Z X H H ZdS = − + − + +Φ  (15) 
and 
 
 ( )*11 1 12 22 11 11 1 2 11* ( ) (1 )(1 )dS Y X H X Z X H H ZdS = − + − + +Φ  (16) 
both of which are ambiguous. The multiplicative term in each equation is positive. The 
first term in the parentheses is positive and represents the complementarities in 
production between the two types of skilled labor. The second term, however, is negative 
and represents the substitutability between labor types. In general, it is impossible to say 
which of these is larger. In the standard models without complementarities, the first term 
is zero, resulting in pure substitutability between skilled labor types. In that case, starting 
from a position of identical countries, a rise in domestic skill reduces FDI. Without 
complementarities, although a rise in foreign skill would increase FDI in my simple 
model, it would reduce domestic use of skilled labor, thus moving the firm from a 
horizontal-looking MNE towards a vertical-style MNE. This result is summarized in the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: If home and host skilled labor are sufficiently complimentary, then a rise 
in skilled labor supply in either country increases FDI. If not, then a rise in home’s 
endowment of skilled labor reduces FDI whereas a rise in host’s skilled labor endowment 
increases FDI. 
 
 
 Thus, when it is highly beneficial to mix the skilled labor types when producing 
headquarter services, FDI will tend to come from and go to skill-abundant countries, a 
pattern that matches the data. At this point, it is worth giving some thought to when 
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complementarities between labor types are likely to be large. At the national level, one 
would expect that factors such as language barriers, cultural differences, and distance 
make it difficult for interaction to take place. Jolly (2002) and Guellec and van 
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001) study international patent citations and find that 
international collaboration is indeed hindered by these factors. Comparable patterns are 
found in empirical studies of FDI. For example, Brainard (1997) finds that a common 
language and a shorter distance increase the FDI activity between the U.S. and another 
country. The regressions in Table 2 also find a negative effect of distance.  
 In addition to factors affecting the ease of communication, there is a body of 
literature that posits that spillovers such as technology transfers are embodied in workers 
and that spillovers occur through labor market churning. Thus, the complementarities 
between types of skilled labor can be interpreted as arising from the spillovers created by 
other firms active in the host country. Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1999) and Keller (2002) find 
that spillovers from technological diffusion are fairly local which is consistent with this 
idea when labor is relatively immobile. In such a case, firms would have an incentive to 
locate near other firms to gain access to their former skilled workers even if that labor is 
not the cheapest available. At the industry level, this would give rise to agglomeration 
patterns, evidence of which is found by Head, Reis, and Swenson (1995) and Guimaraes, 
Figueiredo, and Woodword (2000). Furthermore, one might expect that the importance of 
spillovers varies across industries and are particularly important for skill-intensive 
industries. Since the developed countries, who host the majority of FDI, are also the 
countries that specialize in skill-intensive products, this would give another explanation 
for the cross-country variation in inbound FDI stocks. Furthermore, if investment into a 
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country such as the U.S. is an attempt to gain access to the spillovers embodied in its 
skilled workers, then a reduction in trade barriers from NAFTA would not be expected to 
cause non-members to move their FDI south.  
 The result that increases in FDI can increase employment of both skilled and 
unskilled labor at home also has interesting implications for wages. Given the above 
results, it is clear that when the complementarities between skilled labor types are large, 
then an increase in FDI would increase the wages of both domestic skilled and unskilled 
labor. If the percentage increases are comparable for skilled and unskilled labor, then this 
implies that an increase in FDI would not change the relative wage of production 
workers. This does not happen in the standard models of FDI since increased outbound 
investment means less production of the final good at home. This result can help to 
explain why Slaughter (2000) does not find an effect from outbound FDI on wages but 
outsourcing, which is more akin to vertical FDI, does appear to have negative effects on 
wages. Note that increases in outbound FDI do increase the relative wage of skilled 
workers in the host. This implies that inbound FDI increases the relative wage of skilled 
workers, a result consistent with the empirical findings of Feenstra and Hanson (1997). 
 
4. Conclusion 
 The goal of this paper was to present a simple model of FDI in which headquarter 
services are fragmented across borders in order to take advantage of complementarities 
between different types of labor. This yields two useful results. First, FDI of this type is 
likely to be most prevalent when the home and the host are both well-endowed with 
skilled labor. This fits the observed patterns of investment in which most investment 
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flows between skilled countries. Second, with fragmented headquarter services, increases 
in FDI can increase the wages of all factors used in the multinational industry. This can 
help to explain why we do not observe the detrimental wage effects that standard 
horizontal or vertical models of FDI anticipate. 
 Despite my reluctance to call my model vertical in the traditional sense, it clearly 
has a strong vertical flavor to it. In fact, it is possible to present it somewhat differently 
by describing it as a model with three distinct types of labor, two of which of available at 
home and one of which is available in the host. Since the price of home skilled labor in 
the host and host skilled labor in home are both infinity, one can view fragmented 
headquarter FDI as a type of vertical FDI. I did not choose this route because my 
approach was influenced heavily by the data in which distinctions between types of 
skilled labor are note made (although as my regressions suggest, perhaps they should be). 
Alternatively, since headquarter services are produced in each country, it is also possible 
to cast my model as a variant of horizontal FDI since the same activity is performed in 
multiple countries. I have avoided choosing either of these terms to describe my model 
since it grew out of a reaction to the existing models and is intended to add to them, not 
replace them. Nevertheless, by rethinking the role of fragmentation in FDI, it is possible 
to find something quite akin vertical investment even between similar countries. In a 
world in which production of services is becoming ever more fragmented from 
production, I believe that recognizing that even the production of services can be 
fragmented across borders is useful when analyzing both trade and FDI.  
 Finally, my model has some interesting implications for government policy. Since 
the impact of endowments on FDI and of FDI on wages depend crucially on the degrees 
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to which skilled labor types complement one another, this interaction itself can be the 
target of policy. First, although it is generally recognized that creating a skilled workforce 
can attract FDI overall, it may be possible to target investment from particular countries 
by working to increase country-specific complementarities. For example, in order to 
attract Japanese FDI, it may be worthwhile to concentrate on teaching local workers basic 
Japanese and familiarizing them with Japanese culture. Second, if spillovers are 
embodied in local workers, then increasing labor use by the first MNE in an area may 
increase agglomeration effects. This gives an additional rationale for the performance 
requirements many hosts impose on incoming MNEs that specify hiring levels, 
particularly those in high-skill occupations.11  
                                                 
11 Graham (2000) provides an overview of common performance requirements. 
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Table 1: Parent-Affiliate Trade as a Percentage of Total Affiliate Sales (1997) 
 U.S. Outbound FDI U.S. Inbound FDI 
 Affiliate 
Imports 
Affiliate 
Exports 
Affiliate 
Imports 
Affiliate 
Exports 
All countries 14 15 15 10 
Canada 41 42 14 10 
France 5 4 16 13 
Germany 5 3 15 13 
Netherlands 7 4 13 7 
Switzerland 4 6 8 11 
UK 6 5 9 10 
Australia 9 4 10 9 
Japan 12 4 23 11 
 
Source: Markusen (2002) 
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Table 2: OLS Regressions using U.S. Affiliate Sales 
 
 Skill-abundant Home 
 
Skill-abundant Host 
Parent Skill – Host 
Skill 
-81,146.66*** 
(4.02) 
 220,692.962*** 
(2.88) 
 
Host Skill  866,865.179*** 
(9.36) 
 1096670.833*** 
(6.88) 
Parent Skill  982,537.861*** 
(10.63) 
 750,325.077*** 
(4.31) 
Sum of GDP 9.216*** 
(3.94) 
-17.289*** 
(5.02) 
13.138*** 
(4.42) 
-10.664** 
(2.15) 
GDP difference 
squared 
-0.001*** 
(5.82) 
-0.007*** 
(11.94) 
-0.001*** 
(3.30) 
-0.006*** 
(6.64) 
GDP * Skill 
difference 
5.335** 
(2.49) 
172.508*** 
(10.49) 
-10.824* 
(1.76) 
154.832*** 
(5.78) 
Host Investment 
Cost 
-522.328*** 
(4.04) 
-434.054*** 
(3.45) 
-1,097.216 
(1.42) 
-1,567.315** 
(2.27) 
Host Trade Cost 52.337 
(0.52) 
58.086 
(0.67) 
-46.262 
(0.08) 
380.588 
(0.76) 
Host Trade Cost * 
Skill Difference 
Squared 
3,862.631** 
(2.18) 
2,073.580 
(1.23) 
27,825.125*** 
(2.93) 
21,853.435** 
(2.49) 
Home Trade Cost -420.470* 
(1.81) 
-267.722 
(1.57) 
-73.049 
(0.67) 
-3.260 
(0.03) 
Distance -1.593*** 
(6.55) 
-1.068*** 
(5.38) 
-2.206*** 
(4.46) 
-1.532*** 
(3.47) 
Constant 46,693.869** 
(2.53) 
-194,181.455***
(8.43) 
34,588.645 
(0.94) 
-227,276.240*** 
(4.55) 
Observations 306 306 203 203 
R-squared 0.55 0.71 0.47 0.57 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
